Abstract
The ideal experiment in physics must be conceptual, cunning, and conclusive. Adoption of these same standards in psychology has led to experiments that are uninformative and frivolous. We explain why we believe that psychology is fundamentally incompatible with hypothesis-driven theoretical science and conclude that this erodes the logic behind recent proposals to improve psychological research, such as stricter statistical standards, preregistration, and replication. The failure of psychology is not that it is somehow insufficiently scientific but rather that it makes inordinate use of methods that are a mismatch for the aspirations of researchers in the field, at the expense of valuable empirical research.
Professor at George Washington University
I am a Professor with Human-Technology Collaboration and Educational Technology programs at George Washington University in Washington DC. I have written 12 books and more than 100 articles, and I co-host of the Parsing Science podcast where scientists tell the stories behind their research. I am also the developer of the WeShareScience.com online platform for sharing research videos, and SciencePods.com where researchers can create free podcasts about their science. My research interests include human interactions with intelligent machines, needs, needs assessments, and instructional design.
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